1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	CACE CYCHEMO INC
4	SAGE SYSTEMS, INC.,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- NO. 75
7	MICHAEL LISS,
8	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, NY 12207 September 13, 2022
10	Before:
11	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN
15	Appearances:
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24	Karen Schiffmiller
25	Official Court Transcriber



CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Good afternoon. 1 The 2 first appeal to be argued on today's calendar is number 75, 3 Sage Systems v. Liss. 4 Counsel? 5 MR. RAIMONDI: Your Honors, Christopher Raimondi, 6 of Raimondi Law, P.C., for the appellant. I'd like to 7 reserve two minutes of time for rebuttal. CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Two minutes? 8 9 MR. RAIMONDI: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: You may proceed. 11 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. RAIMONDI: 12 Your Honors, in this case, the partnership 13 agreement at issue does not provide for attorneys' fees in 14 direct actions. That is abundantly clear. The Court of 15 Appeals has made it repeatedly clear that where an 16 indemnification provision is not unmistakably clear in 17 providing for indemnification of attorneys' fees in direct 18 actions, the recovery of such fees are not permitted. 19 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, is your argument 20 primarily that it had to say the words "attorneys' fees" or 2.1 rather that it had to say that you get recovery in direct 2.2 actions? 23 MR. RAIMONDI: Well, it's two parts. 24 one, it doesn't mention attorneys' fees at all, Your Honor,

nor does it even mention a duty to defend. So there's no

mention of attorneys' fees whatsoever.

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JUDGE GARCIA: And is that determinative in your view?

MR. RAIMONDI: No, it is not solely determinative. The second part of it is, that it is of such wide reaching language, that it doesn't, in any way, specify that it applies to direct actions, and that is something that this court has required in Hooper Associates v. AGS Computers, most recently in Ambac Assurance Corporation v. Countrywide Home Loans.

And I believe that three of the justices here today were actually present on the bench, when that decision was rendered in 2018, where the court took a look at Hooper and said, no, no, we got this right, and this is what should be followed. There must be - - - in fact, in Ambac, it said, it must be an unmistakable promise to cover the attorneys' fees in a direct action. Hooper said that the intent must be unmistakably clear. In fact, the Appellate Division First Department, in Gotham Partners, looking at Hooper and applying it, went so far as to say that the intention "must be virtually inescapable."

JUDGE RIVERA: And you're saying there's a different standard if it's direct actions versus third-party?

MR. RAIMONDI: Well, only - - -



1 JUDGE RIVERA: Or the same standard? What - - -2 where are you on that? 3 MR. RAIMONDI: So, the standard is that yes, it's 4 - - - that Hooper applies here, and so does Ambac, and that 5 the issue here is that there is no language. 13.02(b) can 6 be read to cover third-party claims without question. 7 would be a stretch to have it cover direct actions. But 8 the stand - - -9 JUDGE GARCIA: So I'm sorry, it could be read to 10 cover attorneys' fees in third-party actions. So let's - -11 12 MR. RAIMONDI: I - - -13 JUDGE GARCIA: So let's say, that's a little of a 14 confusing question, sorry. But let's say, we have this 15 clause, and you - - - it's between the two of us. You get 16 sued by a third-party based on my actions. You lose or you 17 win, defending it. You now come after me for 18 indemnification, right? 19 That's a third-party action. MR. RAIMONDI: 20 Your Honor. 21 That's the third-party action. JUDGE GARCIA: 22 MR. RAIMONDI: Correct. 23 JUDGE GARCIA: And so, that would be - - - would 24 that be enough, the language that you have in here, to

allow you to recover from me for attorneys' fees?

1	MR. RAIMONDI: Is it not clear from this language
2	that attorneys' fees are even covered, but the best
3	argument would be in the context of a third-party action,
4	that there may be coverage for it.
5	JUDGE GARCIA: But didn't we say in Breed that
6	this language did provide coverage for
7	MR. RAIMONDI: Well, that Breed's a
8	different situation, Your Honor, okay. In Breed, the
9	agreement at issue was not a partnership agreement as we
10	have here. This was an escrow agreement, where a law firm
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12	JUDGE GARCIA: No, I understand the difference in
13	the contracts, but the language in Breed was exactly
14	pretty much exactly the same as what you have here.
15	MR. RAIMONDI: No, the difference here, Your
16	Honors, is that this court was unable to conceive of any
17	way possible that that language could apply to a third-
18	party
19	JUDGE GARCIA: Right.
20	MR. RAIMONDI: action, given the nature of
21	the contract.
22	JUDGE GARCIA: But it didn't say attorneys' fees
23	in that language.
24	MR. RAIMONDI: It did not say attorneys' fees in
25	that action, but the issue was, what other damages would

1 there be to an escrow agent, an attorney acting as an 2 escrow agent, in the event that something went wrong. 3 would be that they would be sued and have to defend against 4 those claims. 5 JUDGE GARCIA: I thought it was more that in what 6 other context would this apply than in a direct action. 7 MR. RAIMONDI: Well, correct. It is that. And 8 that's because it was an escrow agreement. If this were 9 not an escrow agreement, it's not clear to me that the same 10 decision would occur. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay - - -12 CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: So as a baseline rule, if 13 the conclusion that it covers attorneys' fees is 14 inescapable in the context of the agreement, the fact that 15 it doesn't say attorneys' fees, could still permit such a 16 recovery? 17 MR. RAIMONDI: In the narrow application of Breed 18 Abbott based upon the type of agreement that it is.

is not that type of agreement.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. So I need to get back to my question, because I - - - I - - -

MR. RAIMONDI: Yes, Your Honor.

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JUDGE RIVERA: Perhaps you were trying to answer it, but I didn't understand the answer. Is there a different standard that applies, if it's a direct action,



_	versus a unird-party action?
2	MR. RAIMONDI: Is there a different standard? I
3	I don't
4	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, a standard to determine
5	whether or not broad language, like what we have here, like
6	what existed in Breed, encompasses attorneys' fees.
7	MR. RAIMONDI: It well, the issue is the
8	language -
9	JUDGE RIVERA: Or is it always the same standard.
LO	The standard either way.
L1	MR. RAIMONDI: It is always the un in my
L2	understanding
L3	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
L4	MR. RAIMONDI: from the decisions of this
L5	court
L6	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
L7	MR. RAIMONDI: and back in Hooper
L8	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
L9	MR. RAIMONDI: is that it must be
20	unmistakably clear. There must be an unmistakable promise
21	that one party is going to cover another party's attorneys'
22	fees in a direct action. And if it does not do so, then
23	such a recovery of attorneys' fees
24	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, so my
25	MR. RAIMONDI: is not possible.

1	JUDGE RIVERA: I get that. Okay. So my question		
2	is, does that mean it's a different standard if it's a		
3	third-party action? That's the question I'm trying to get		
4	you to answer.		
5	MR. RAIMONDI: No, no. I think I think the		
6	answer is this. If the with the third-party action,		
7	I don't think that there's a question that it covers third-		
8	party actions. I think that the language does cover		
9	cover third-party actions. Broad language, this court, has		
10	found does cover third-party actions, and in fact, we		
11	JUDGE RIVERA: Third-party actions to recover		
12	attorneys' fees?		
13	MR. RAIMONDI: Correct. Damages, attorneys'		
14	fees, yes. That is correct. That I		
15	JUDGE RIVERA: So you're saying then it is a		
16	different standard		
17	MR. RAIMONDI: No, it		
18	JUDGE RIVERA: for a direct action?		
19	MR. RAIMONDI: The the		
20	JUDGE RIVERA: It's a straightforward question.		
21	Is it the exact same standard?		
22	MR. RAIMONDI: I don't believe it's a different		
23	standard. I believe that I believe the Ambac and		
24	Hooper standards are the standards that should be applied,		
25	which is based upon the language.		

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Regardless if it's direct or a
2	third-party action, is that your point?
3	MR. RAIMONDI: Correct. Well, that's how you
4	deter yes, that's how the determination is made.
5	Yes, through that standard.
6	JUDGE GARCIA: But so I guess that I come
7	back to we un this provision is an indemnification
8	provision, right? So it clearly applies if, in my
9	hypothetical, you get sued by a third-party, you have to
10	defend based on my misconduct, right?
11	MR. RAIMONDI: Okay. This Your Honor, this
12	particular provision actually has a threshold question of
13	bad faith, before we get to that
14	JUDGE GARCIA: Um-hum. Understood. Understood.
15	MR. RAIMONDI: but let's assume
16	JUDGE GARCIA: Understood.
17	MR. RAIMONDI: that for the moment, and the
18	purpose of your question.
19	JUDGE GARCIA: Good point. Let's assume it.
20	MR. RAIMONDI: Okay. So assuming that they're -
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22	JUDGE GARCIA: So, in that case, you turn around
23	to me you win, but you spend money defending the
24	action, and I've committed something that got you sued, my
25	conduct, you turn around, and you want to recover your

1	fees, expenses, et cetera, under this indemnification
2	provision, yes or no?
3	MR. RAIMONDI: I think under this indemnification
4	provision, the question of attorneys' fees is up for
5	debate, and I don't believe that it would be recoverable in
6	that context.
7	JUDGE WILSON: Because it doesn't say attorneys'
8	fees or why?
9	MR. RAIMONDI: Because it doesn't say attorneys'
10	fees. It also does not reference a duty to defend. There
11	is nothing to indicate that these expenses or fees would
12	cover attorneys' fees.
13	JUDGE WILSON: So would one or the other be
14	sufficient?
15	MR. RAIMONDI: Something to indicate that the
16	parties I, personally, based upon this court's
17	rulings, it should be unmistakable an unmistakable
18	promise, or a clear, unequivocal language it was intended.
19	JUDGE WILSON: Oh, I thought we were talking
20	about third-party action now, not about an action between -
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22	MR. RAIMONDI: For either. It should really be
23	clear what the parties intended. There's nothing wrong
24	with having a clear contract.
25	JUDGE GARCIA: Let's say this said attorneys'



fees, right. And now, it says attorneys' fees, same 1 2 hypothetical we've just been using. Now you turn around 3 and you want indemnification from me. Let's say - - -4 different case. It says attorneys' fees. Same provision, 5 but it has attorneys' fees in it. Now you sue me directly 6 for something under the partnership agreement, right. I've 7 done something wrong. Do you - - - and you win. Do you 8 get attorneys' fees or does it have to say it's a direct 9 act - - - it a direct action? MR. RAIMONDI: Right, exactly. It does not say 10 direct action. There is nothing to indicate direct action, 11 12 13

JUDGE GARCIA: Even if it had the specific language, you'd still need something to indicate it applies in direct actions?

MR. RAIMONDI: Yes, Your Honor. I see my time expired; may I answer?

JUDGE GARCIA: That's okay.

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CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Yes.

MR. RAIMONDI: Thank you.

So the answer is this, with respect to thirdparty actions, if the word attorneys' fees was in this
provision, they'd be entitled to attorneys' fees for thirdparty actions. In - - with respect to direct actions, as
there's no language showing any intent, and certainly not



clear intent, of the parties to be bound to each other to 1 2 pay for attorneys' fees in a direct action, attorneys' fees 3 are not recoverable. 4 JUDGE GARCIA: Another way to say that, though, 5 would be if we agree with you on direct action, we don't 6 have to go - - - get to the language issue. MR. RAIMONDI: Well, cor - - - well, you have to 7 8 use the language to get to direct action. You have to look 9 at the language of the agreement in order to determine - -10

JUDGE GARCIA: But if we say it doesn't apply to direct action, who cares what it says?

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MR. RAIMONDI: Well, Your Honor, it's not what I said. The motion court the motion court itself said, "the provision contains no reference to direct claims between the parties." That's the record at page 10. That was in the decision of the motion court. The motion court found it didn't apply to direct actions.

CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you, Counsel.

MR. RAIMONDI: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. SEEMAN: May it please the court, my name is Fred Seeman, and I represent the respondent in this - - - in this action, and the plaintiff in the original action, Sage Systems.

I believe that if we go back to the underlying



action there is every justification for the trigger of this 1 indemnification clause. Otherwise - - -2 3 JUDGE TROUTMAN: What is the un - - -4 MR. SEEMAN: - - - you're going - - -5 JUDGE TROUTMAN: What is the unmistakably clear 6 language that requires attorneys' fees? 7 MR. SEEMAN: In Section B of the agreement, 8 "shall be indemnified and held harmless by each partner 9 from any and all claims and" - - - "and causes of action of 10 any nature whatsoever arising out of, or incidental to any 11 act performed by a partner, which is not performed in good 12 faith, not reasonably believed to be by such partner to be 13 in the best interest of the partnership, and" - - - I'm 14 just skipping a little - - - "and is not reason" - - - "is 15 not reasonably believed by such partner, to be in the best" 16 17 JUDGE RIVERA: But that doesn't go - - - that 18 doesn't go to the recovery, which is, I believe, what Judge 19 Troutman is asking about. Where's the part that says you 20 can recover attorneys' fees, given everything else? 21 Okay. Again, I would go back to the MR. SEEMAN: 22 original action that was really - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, in this provision. 24 MR. SEEMAN: It doesn't say that - - - it doesn't 25 say that specifically. If you go - - - if you're going to

1 parse the language - - -2 JUDGE RIVERA: We wouldn't be here if it said it 3 specifically. 4 MR. SEEMAN: Right. Exact - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: So here's the question. 6 MR. RAIMONDI: Right. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: What - - - where can one infer or 8 somehow conclude from this language that it includes 9 attorneys' fees? Or is there some precedent of ours that 10 you would say, that tells you - - -11 MR. SEEMAN: I would - - - I would go to the lan 12 13 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that this language equates 14 with attorneys' fees? 15 MR. SEEMAN: Your Honor, I'd go to the language 16 of Breed. Breed says, if not here, when then? If - - - it 17 doesn't have attorneys' fees - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: But Counsel, to that 19 question, the language you just read could include 20 attorneys' fees, but it could include many other items of 2.1 indemnification. So my question is, how - - - what makes 22 it inescapably, pardon me, concludable, that it was meant 23 to include attorneys' fees as well? 24 MR. SEEMAN: I would go - - - again, I would 25 refer this court to the language of Breed, where the court

1 used the common sense - - -2 JUDGE TROUTMAN: What about the argument that 3 Breed was applied to those unique facts only? 4 MR. SEEMAN: I think we have those unique facts 5 here, Judge. You have, what I would amount to, a judicial 6 mugging, by one partner of another. What we're really 7 saying is, the motion court, Justice James was unbelievably 8 kind and polite, and in a sense, I'm here - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: But no, no, the unique facts that 10 I think that question that Judge Troutman is asking is 11 related to, is not the nature of the trigger, right, the 12 bad conduct. It is the whole point of the provision, 13 right? 14 MR. SEEMAN: That is correct. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: And in - - - in Breed - - -16 MR. SEEMAN: I agree with that. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - it's - - - the court is 18 actually looking beyond the language, and saying, the only 19 point to this clause is to ensure that legal expenses are 20 covered, which includes attorneys' fees. 2.1 MR. SEEMAN: And I would conclude, as did the 22 Appellate Division and the motion court, that that's the 23 same reasoning that ought to apply here. That you want not 24

JUDGE RIVERA: But that's based on the

relationship there, because it's an escrow account. 1 And 2 it's an escrowee - - -3 MR. SEEMAN: In the relationship - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - which is not - - - these are 5 partners. 6 MR. SEEMAN: Understood, Your Honor. And the 7 relationship here is a partner. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 9 MR. SEEMAN: One partner attacks another partner 10 to dissolve the partnership. So in the language of this particular indemnification, it's certainly not in the best 11 12 interest of the corporation. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I'm not going to debate with 14 you that it might very well fall within a category of 15 conduct that allows for an action. The question is, are 16 attorneys' fees recoverable? Maybe you can get the costs, 17 damages, expenses, so the question is, why don't I see the 18 words attorneys' fees or even the word fee? MR. SEEMAN: We ought not - - - I respectfully 19 20 submit, we ought not as a court - - - as a court, to 21 require practitioners to parse the words in such detail 22 that here - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, if the court says, you got 24 to include the words attorneys' fees, wouldn't that make it 25 easy? Everybody moving forward knows, always include them.

1	You won't have to you won't have an appealable issue.
2	MR. SEEMAN: I respectfully submit that that
3	would not be a particularly good policy
4	JUDGE WILSON: But you didn't
5	MR. SEEMAN: because now
6	JUDGE WILSON: you didn't in your papers
7	address Ambac. Would you like to address it? I mean,
8	Ambac the language in the contract in Ambac actually
9	says attorneys' fees, and we nevertheless said they were
LO	not recoverable.
L1	MR. SEEMAN: Right.
L2	JUDGE WILSON: So this is your chance to say
L3	something about Ambac, if you'd like.
L4	MR. SEEMAN: I don't we didn't address it
L5	in the papers. We don't think that it is persuasive here.
L6	Now we think that we rely upon Breed. As the
L7	language in Ambac was a traditional indemnification, but it
18	was it was
L9	JUDGE WILSON: That included attorneys' fees
20	expressly.
21	MR. SEEMAN: Yes, it did yes, it did.
22	JUDGE WILSON: Yeah.
23	MR. SEEMAN: But in that instance in that
24	instance, the relationship was different. It was between
25	two very independent parties. Here, you have two partners.

So I fall back to the relationship of the - - - of the facts. Meaning, you have two partners, and you have an attack on the very partnership itself. A very different situation than exists in Ambac.

JUDGE SINGAS: Counselor?

MR. SEEMAN: Yes.

JUDGE SINGAS: You keep commenting on Breed. But didn't Breed stand for the proposition that if there was no

didn't Breed stand for the proposition that if there was no other cost, other than attorney fees, and we could rely on that for attorneys' fees. Is your contention here that there are no other costs - - -

MR. SEEMAN: That's exact - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: - - - that would be covered?

MR. SEEMAN: That is exactly correct, Judge.

Thank you. That's - - - if - - - and this is an instance where we - - - how have we been damaged? By a completely false accusation, a completely baseless complaint. How else have we been damaged but for forcing us to defend ourselves and pay for attorneys' fees. So yes, I - - - that is - - - that is the proposition that I set forth before Your Honors.

JUDGE RIVERA: Can I ask? I'm sorry if you've answered it. It's the same question I was asking to your adversary. Is it your view that it's the same or a different standard that applies to a direct action, versus



1 a third-party action? 2 MR. SEEMAN: I believe it's the same standards. 3 That if you committed - - - if one partner committed a 4 fraud, and forced a third-party to sue the partnership - -5 6 JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, I mean, in terms of 7 interpreting the provision. Interpreting this provision. 8 MR. SEEMAN: I - - - I - - - I thought I 9 understood that. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: Is it - - - is the Hooper standard? 11 12 MR. SEEMAN: Yes. I'm sorry? 13 JUDGE RIVERA: Is it the Hooper standard? 14 MR. SEEMAN: No, it's going to be - - - no, it's 15 not going to be the Hooper standard. It's going to be - -16 - I would go - - - that's difficult, yes. I would say, 17 yes, because, you know, depending on the facts. Here, I 18 believe, that the facts as before you are very close to 19 Breed. I think you'd have to - - -20 JUDGE GARCIA: Well, your provision is exactly 21 the same, almost as Breed, right. It doesn't say 22 attorneys' fees, and either did the provision in Breed. 23 Whereas the provision in Ambac said attorneys' fees. So it 24 seems the one rule we could gather from those cases is 25 whether or not in a direct action versus a third-party

action, the inclusion specifically of the magic words 2 attorneys' fees isn't determinative, right? 3 I agree with that. I agree with MR. SEEMAN: 4 I think that Your Honors are going to have to look, 5 and the court's going to have to look at the set of facts 6 in each instance. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but so if it's not 8 determinative, what are the factors or considerations for a 9 court to look at? 10 MR. SEEMAN: Where - - -11 JUDGE RIVERA: If the words themselves are not 12 good enough? 13 MR. SEEMAN: Where it's unequivoc - - -14 unequivocally referable. Where you look at the facts, you 15 look at the language, there's no other conclusion that you 16 can draw. And I would, again, respectfully submit that 17 that's what happened here. You can't - - -18 JUDGE GARCIA: But I guess the question to me 19 would be what's inescapable? Is it attorneys' fees are 20 included or that the indemnification provision provides to 21 direct actions between these parties? 22 That the direct - - - that the MR. SEEMAN: 23 indemnification provides for the direct action between the 24 parties. And it is meant to deter the kind of conduct that 25 occurred here. That's why that provision what in that, to

1	prevent the filing of baseless claims against one partner	
2	by another, to destroy that partnership.	
3	And I know Your Honors, or at least today I'm	
4	getting a sense, it's obviously, in retrospect, it	
5	would have been nice if it said attorneys' fees, and you're	
6	correct. But I don't think that should be the hard and	
7	fast rule. I believe that you do have the kind of facts	
8	here	
9	JUDGE RIVERA: But why why not? Why not	
10	have that rule?	
11	MR. SEEMAN: Because you're going to hurt	
12	JUDGE RIVERA: There's obviously some confusion.	
13	MR. SEEMAN: I you're going to I	
14	think it goes against	
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Let me say this. If it didn't say	
16	damages, do you think damages are covered?	
17	MR. SEEMAN: Yes. No, if it didn't say damages?	
18	JUDGE RIVERA: If it didn't have the word	
19	damages, could you recover damages?	
20	MR. SEEMAN: No. If it it has to say	
21	damages, otherwise, that's the broadest of all.	
22	JUDGE RIVERA: So if it doesn't say attorneys'	
23	fees, why should attorneys' fees be covered?	
24	MR. SEEMAN: Because attorneys' fees are a subset	
25	of damages. In this instance, the only damage we the	

only damage we suffered was attorneys' fees. That's why 1 2 it's recoverable here, with this clause. And I think it'd 3 be wrong - - - I think it - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: Did you make that argument below 5 that fees are actually are actually subsumed by the word 6 damages? 7 MR. SEEMAN: No. We did not. I did not argue -8 - - I argued that now, because that's - - - those are - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: You agree that there, of course, are many lawyers who, in their string sight of what's 10 11 recoverable, do not - - - do include attorneys' fees as a 12 separate category from damages. 13 MR. SEEMAN: I do, Your Honor, and I certain - -14 - I'm not standing here advocating that, you know, we ought 15 to be loose and fast. I'm just saying - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: And there are statutes that 17 expressly allow for recovery of attorney fees, even though 18 otherwise damages would be recovered. That - - -19 That's correct. I understand that. MR. SEEMAN: 20 JUDGE RIVERA: Right, legislators have found it 21 necessary to say that, because we have the thing called the 22 American Rule, right? 23 MR. SEEMAN: I agree with you, but I think to 24 slavishly follow that rule here would be a disservice. 25 I think that's why we need to - - - that's why I



1 respectfully submit that the decisions below ought to be 2 affirmed. 3 CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you, Counsel. 4 MR. SEEMAN: Thank you, Your Honors. 5 JUDGE SINGAS: Counsel, can you address the 6 question that I asked? What other types of disputes do you 7 think this indemnification provision could cover? 8 MR. RAIMONDI: I think that it can - - I think 9 that what it's designed to cover primarily is third-party 10 disputes, where a partner behaves in a manner that is 11 outside or a recent detour that creates liability for the 12 partnership and/or the partners. That's what it was 13 designed to prevent. It's - - - I don't think it was 14 designed to prevent direct action between the partners. Ιt 15 makes no mention of that. It seems to be very well focused 16 on an act that would be ultra vires, inappropriate. 17 talks about fraud. It talks about a partner going off and 18 doing something that creates liability for the partnership 19 and its partners. 20 CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: So is it your position 21 that none of these items that are - - - that can be 22 indemnified under this agreement would be indemnified in a direct action? 23 24 MR. RAIMONDI: Yes, because it doesn't apply - -

- it doesn't apply to direct actions, correct.

JUDGE GARCIA: And would one way to look at that be, as I'm thinking about it, the fact that it doesn't include attorneys' fees, one indication that it doesn't apply to direct actions? It's not the sole indication, but one indication.

MR. RAIMONDI: It - - - it's not even requiring, as I had said before - - - it's not even requiring a duty to defend. Nothing related to attorneys' fees or defensive action in any way is referenced at all in this provision.

JUDGE GARCIA: But I guess my point is, in terms of indemnification, when you're coming to try to recover something from me for having to defend against this third-party action, indemnification covers a number of different things subsumed in type - - - this type of Breed language.

If it was intended to apply to direct actions, the American Rule would kick in, and you'd want to specifically mention attorneys' fees in there?

MR. RAIMONDI: Well, correct. I mean, look, the --- the right way to do this, Your Honor, is I --- I think would be a prevailing party provision that directly addresses this. That separate provision, as what was found in other cases, where there is language that is clear that it applies to direct actions, and other language that --- that the more broader language is applied to the third-party actions, is the correct way to go. I think the best

practice here is a separate prevailing party clause related to direct actions.

Just to address something else with respect to the damages that Mr. Seeman was arguing about. With respect to the unclean hands' argument, that that was made here, and we believe that the finding is incorrect, because it doesn't meet the three-part test of this, the third branch of which is, that the party was injured by the conduct. Well, in Ambac, this court specifically said, "Attorneys' fees are treated as incidents of litigation, rather than damages, except where an award is authorized by agreement between the parties, or by statute, or by court rule."

Well, none of that exists here. So the damages can't make the basis of unclean hands, if there isn't unclean hands. It was a proper finding by the dissolution court, then, 13.02, we respectfully submit, does not apply at all, and therefore, there's no reason to even get to that part of it.

CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you, counsel.

MR. RAIMONDI: Thank you, Your Honors.

(Court is adjourned)

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		CERTIFICATION
2		
3	I, K	aren Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing
4	transcript of	proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Sage
5	Systems, Inc. v. Michael Liss, No. 75 was prepared using	
6	the required transcription equipment and is a true and	
7	accurate record of the proceedings.	
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